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Despite their significant, growing contribution to global emissions, international aviation and shipping
have avoided a significant climate governance response until recently. This paper outlines the urgent
need for, but major barriers to, decarbonisation of these industries, including various market failures and
sensitivities over restraining demand. The need and potential for international governance to address
these issues is seen to vary across aviation and shipping, given different industry structures and char-
acteristics. A range of relevant inter- and transnational governance institutions is highlighted and an
assessment of their overall adequacy offered. With a 2018 commitment to significant emission reduction,
maritime governance effort has progressed further, although significant implementation challenges
remain. Meanwhile aviation-related commitments rely more on out-of-sector offsets. Options for
enhancing governance for decarbonisation are outlined, highlighting the importance of, inter alia, co-
ordination between the UNFCCC and sectoral bodies, mechanisms to finance R&D and incentivise in-
vestment, and openness in key decision-making fora.
© 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Driven by increasing demand for international transport, carbon
emissions from aviation and shipping have grown significantly in
recent decades. Having increased around 80% between 1990 and
2010, CO2 emissions have been forecast to rise by 50e250% by 2050
for shipping (IMO, 2014), and could triple for aviation (IEA, 2019).
Although aviation and shipping currently each emit around 3% of
global CO2 (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018), international
transport’s share looks set to grow as other sectoral systems’
mitigation plans take effect.
Governance efforts to tackle these trends face a range of diffi-
culties, not least the need to allocate responsibility for international
emissions not covered by domestic policies. Determining what
constitutes a fair contribution to delivering long-term temperature
goals is complex. Nevertheless, the long-term temperature goal
enshrined in the Paris Agreement (PA) effectively requires all sec-
tors to decarbonise as rapidly as possible. More specifically, ‘Paris
compliance’ by international shipping arguably requires 70e100%
emissions reduction by 2050, from 2008 levels (T&E, 2018a), whilen open access article under the CC
e slow route to decarbonisati
/j.esg.2021.100100according to Lee (2018), any continued fossil fuel usage by aviation
will become irreconcilable with a 1.5 C warming target around
mid-century, assuming no further measures (such as implementing
negative emissions technologies).
Against this challenging sectoral backdrop, this paper assesses
the potential of international governance to contribute to adequate
mitigation effort, and the extent to which it has been utilized. It
does so by applying a framework for sectoral system analysis in
which international institutions are understood to establish sub-
stantive rules and norms that can prescribe, proscribe, permit or
direct relevant behaviour of state and non-state actors, and to entail
procedural rules for making and implementing related decisions
(Oberthür et al., this issue). In addition to inter-governmental
bodies, it includes transnational institutions run exclusively by
non-state actors, as well as hybrids featuring both non-state and
state actors. In this way, the paper contributes original analysis of
the state of climate governance in the international transport sec-
tors which, when combined with other contributions to this special
issue, allows broader conclusions on the adequacy of global climate
governance to be derived (see Rayner et al., this issue).
In addition to extensive desk-based research and literature re-
view, the paper draws on three elite interviews to derive its
assessment of the most important sectorally-specific governanceBY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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are met by existing arrangements. Research for this paper was
conducted primarily in 2018e19, and associated judgments
regarding adequacy of ‘governance supply’ largely reflect the state
of affairs as of that period.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, sectoral trans-
formation challenges and related governance needs are set out,
highlighting what needs to change to deliver decarbonisation, and
key barriers to those changes. The potential benefits, in principle, of
international cooperation are set out. Potentially relevant in-
stitutions/initiatives are outlined in section 3, followed by an
assessment of the extent to which, in combination, they fulfil key
governance functions (section 4). Potential options to improve the
adequacy of governance are then sketched (section 5), before
conclusions are offered (section 6).
2. Transformation challenges and governance needs
In setting out various potential means of decarbonisation, and
challenges they face, this section distinguishes between technology
(including alternative fuels) and operational/demand-side aspects.
Mitigation potentials vary significantly: while shipping has various
effective short-tomedium-term options available, aviation does not
(making off-setting or emissions trading attractive propositions). In
exploring barriers to decarbonisation, the section pays particular
attention to respective industry structures and how these relate to
wider economic and societal trends. The potential benefits, in
principle, of international cooperation in addressing these barriers
and challenges, are then set out.
2.1. Means of decarbonisation
For international shipping, near-full decarbonisation as early as
2035 is widely considered technically possible, through the
maximum deployment of currently known technologies (ITF, 2018).
For short distances, concepts and prototypes exist for electric and
hydrogen fuel cell-powered vessels. Over longer distances, biofuels,
renewable hydrogen and other hydrogen-derived fuels such as
ammonia are being considered. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) use can
reduce current emissions intensity, but a fleet-wide switch would
risk further carbon lock-in and deliver insufficient decarbonisation
(Bows-Larkin, 2015). Although experience is limited, and wider
sustainability concerns from their production endure, biofuels
(preferably second and third generation) have been considered the
most viable alternative for replacing, or blending with, the heavy
fuel oil commonly used to power ships (IMO, 2015). Pending
greater clarity regarding which systems will dominate shipping’s
low-carbon transition, it is likely that different niche opportunities
will be exploited by different actors.
Decarbonising international shipping is increasingly recognised
as requiring cross-sectoral effort (UMAS and ETC, 2019). Since fossil
fuels constitute around 40% of seaborne cargo (Sharmina et al.,
2017), growth of renewable electricity and bioenergy use in other
sectors could reduce demand for shipping significantly. Signifi-
cantly, decarbonisation of electricity supply is also necessary for the
sustainable manufacture of alternative fuels, notably hydrogen and
ammonia. Operationally, ports can contribute by providing, inter-
alia, power, charging systems and bunkering for alternative fuels.
To allow emissions to peak and decline sooner, ‘slow steaming’
(speed limits) could reduce emissions by around a third with little
economic impact on long-distance exporters (CE Delft, 2017).
Overall, successful mitigation requires consideration of the in-
terdependencies between ship speed, level and pattern of demand
for services, and the extent and rate of innovation in propulsion
technology (Walsh et al., 2017). Given relatively slow rates of2
(adoption of) technological innovation, ‘it is difficult to foresee how
deep decarbonisation can be achieved without an immediate, fleet-
wide speed reduction’ (Walsh et al., 2017: 32).
For (international) aviation, while cost considerations have long
driven efficiency gains, opportunities for further technological
improvements are scarce, at least in the short term. The industry’s
own targets (see section 3.2 below) imply on-going technological
developments offering a 1e2% annual efficiency improvement.
More fundamental innovations could halve fuel intensity, but
require fleet renewal (which, with aircraft life averaging 30 years, is
slow). Currently, ‘drop-in’ sustainable aviation fuel (SAF)
(comprising either biofuel or synthetic fuel) is more practicable.
According to the IEA (2017a), achievement of its 2030 Sustainable
Development Scenario would require tripling use of sustainable
biofuels. While commercial short-distance hybrid-electric flight is a
near-term prospect, fuller electrification requires significant ad-
vances in battery technology (Sch€afer et al., 2019). Latterly, hopes
have been raised that use of hydrogen fuel cells can achieve
75e90% emission reductions from short-medium distance flights
(Clean Sky 2 JU, 2020).
In operational terms, efficiency-optimised routing has some
potential (Larsson et al., 2019). Much more could be achieved
through demand management, especially as nearly 90% of aviation
emissions are from (often highly discretionary) passenger traffic.
High-speed rail’s potential as an alternative mode is limited,
however, since around 80% of all aviation emissions are from flights
over 1500 km (ATAG, 2014). Improved videoconferencing has po-
tential, but raising ticket prices may be the most effective demand
management instrument.
Although more challenging than shipping, recent analyses have
suggested that aviation decarbonisation by 2050 is technically
feasible, and that prospects are maximised by pursuing some
combination of electrical (or hydrogen) propulsion, demand
reduction, and limited (temporary) offsetting, with increased use of
SAF in themeantime (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018; Cames
et al., 2015: 41).
2.2. Barriers to decarbonisation
Of the two, the simpler industrial structure of aviation e two
dominant manufacturers and a few key airlines e is more condu-
cive, in principle, to decarbonisation. For shipping, multiple
builders, financers, owners, operators, shippers, charterers and
end-users complicate the regulatory landscape (Bows-Larkin,
2015). Arguably, shipping’s low public profile has shielded it from
public pressure. Globalisation has driven emissions growth in both
sectors. Between 1970 and 2013, total international seaborne cargo
rose from 2.6 to 9.5 bn. tonnes (Gençsü and Hino, 2015), and sub-
sequent growth rates have continued to exceed global GDP increase
(DNV GL, 2019). Meanwhile, burgeoning global tourism has driven
rapid growth in air travel (Piera, 2015).
With shipping, a complex set of organisational/structural,
behavioural, market and non-market barriers to decarbonisation
exists (ITF, 2018). The fundamental market failure, split incentives
between ship owners and hirers (the ‘landlord-tenant’ problem),
limits owners’ motivation to invest in solutions benefiting others.
Non-market barriers include the diversity of ship class and size, the
markets and trade routes served and (non-)access to capital. For
their part, investors tend to be risk averse, while many banks have
reduced their ship financing commitments, restricting access to
capital and credit necessary for technology retrofits (Gençsü and
Hino, 2015). While increased uptake of innovative technologies
can bring capital costs down, perceived technical risk can further
increase such cost. Significant rates of fleet turnover and/or retro-
fitting are necessary (Walsh et al., 2017). Moreover, widespread
1 Domestic flights make up around 35% of total emissions from aviation. These
are covered under Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (Fleming and
Ziegler 2016).
2 Port State refers to countries of entry, with whose laws visiting ships must
comply when in port.
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demonstration and knowledge exchange. Lack of reliable cost-
related information deters ship owners (Gençsü and Hino, 2015).
Shipping R&D, particularly for initial proofs-of-concept, has
been chronically under-funded, with neither firms nor govern-
ments (for the most part) stepping up (Smith, interview). In-
centives to fund risky technological R&D unilaterally on the world’s
behalf are not clear.
Halving international shipping’s GHG emissions by 2050 may
require $1 trillion of capital investment, the overwhelming major-
ity of which would be devoted to land-based infrastructure,
including fuel production and storage facilities (UMAS and ETC,
2019). This implies that the necessary effort can be shared to
some extent with other sectors, including land-based transport, but
also that low-carbon electricity to power fuel production processes
must be abundant and affordable. Regarding biofuels, the IEA
(2017a) has reported that current supply only covers about 15% of
the total demand. The potential of advanced biofuels ultimately
depends on a number of factors, including the global availability of
sustainable feedstock.
Operationally, acceptability of slow steaming may depend on
steps to maintain freight flows through increases in ship size or
number, and potentially some form of compensation if supply
chains cannot be suitably adapted (Walsh et al., 2017).
While the simpler industry structure of aviation is more
conducive to regulating for decarbonisation, significant commer-
cial, technological and cultural barriers exist here too. For example,
complete decarbonisation of air transport could require 30e60% of
the total global sustainable biofuels supply (Victor et al., 2019) -
against strong competition from other uses (including shipping).
But with costs around three times those of conventional fuel, and
uncertain market demand, SAF production has been sluggish (IEA,
2017a), constituting just 0.1% of fuel used (IEA, 2019). Mandating
of its use by one airport may cause re-routing. As with shipping,
wider social and environmental impacts of biofuel production
provoke great concern, particularly if cost considerations and lack
of scalable alternatives lead to reliance on palm oil, for example. As
with many low-carbon alternative fuels for shipping, SAF produc-
tion at scale requires abundant supplies of affordable, low-carbon
electricity. Although the industry favours off-setting measures,
here too uncertainty looms over long-term availability, integrity
and/or cost of credits, particularly in view of demand from other
sectors (Gençsü and Hino, 2015). Aviation demand management is
a sensitive issue.
Regulatory uncertainty and inconsistency, and lack of demand
for alternatives are commonly highlighted as critical barriers to
decarbonisation by both aviation and shipping industries (on the
latter, see e.g. Shell and Deloitte, 2020, on the former Victor et al.,
2019). For both sectors, the incentive to reduce fuel use, or
develop and switch to alternatives, is significantly undermined by
the absence of taxation of aviation and shipping fuels (for reasons
outlined below).
Lobbying weight of incumbent players represents a further,
rather formidable institutional and political challenge for both
shipping and aviation. Shipping trade associations, in particular the
International Chamber of Shipping (representing over 80% of the
global merchant fleet), while ostensibly accepting the need to
deliver a ‘fair share’ of emissions reduction (Platten, 2019), insist
that policy instruments must not inhibit development. Large
developing or emerging countries have also tended to resist
ambitious target-setting (as do developed countries such as Japan.
For its part, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) has
promoted relatively limited kinds of change e particularly off-
setting - to pre-empt more fundamental, costly interventions
(Peeters et al., 2016).3
2.3. The promise and potential of international cooperation
Since the vast majority of aviation and shipping activity takes
place across national borders,1 international-level action is essen-
tial to effective governance of decarbonisation. Imposition of
stricter requirements on ships in one state’s registry, for example,
may simply prompt owners to re-register (or build) elsewhere,
using ‘flags of convenience’. International shipping decarbonisation
is arguably most effectively steered by a combination of global and
port-state-level measures (Bows-Larkin, 2015; ITF, 2018).2 Strong
global competition also necessitates international cooperation
regarding aviation, to overcome the aforementioned disincentives
to unilateral action by e.g. airlines or airports (Victor et al., 2019).
For both shipping and aviation, adequately addressing the regula-
tory uncertainty, inconsistency and lack of demand that impede the
scaling up of alternative fuels requires international, cross-sectoral
action. International cooperation is also required to underpin the
integrity and effectiveness of any off-setting or carbon trading
schemes.
The introductory article of this special issue (Oberthür et al., this
issue) sets out five general functions that international institutions
can in principle perform, contributing to effective decarbonisation
(summarised in Table 1). In the following, the importance of these
functions to decarbonisation of international transport is identified,
highlighting international institutions’ theoretical potential to
overcome the barriers and challenges discussed above.
Issues related to research and development (R&D) are covered
under both ‘means of implementation’ and ‘knowledge and
learning’ functions. This is because R&D requires both finance
(potentially involving government subsidy), and also a degree of
collaboration in conducting it, and demonstrating any resulting
innovations.2.3.1. Guidance and signal
Given their high projected growth e potentially taking up as
much as 40% of a global 2 C carbon budget by mid-century (Cames
et al., 2015) - there is a significant need for a global-level signal of
roughly what level of emissions constitutes international trans-
port’s ‘fair share’ in achieving the PA’s long-term goal. Furthermore,
a clear definition of (net) zero carbon needs to be signalled, clari-
fying for example that alternative fuel production processes should
be fossil-free, and that indirect emissions from biofuels need ac-
counting for.2.3.2. Setting rules to facilitate collective action
There is also a significant need to incentivise and facilitate
international-scale action through regulation. Emission limits
could be implemented internationally by market-based in-
struments or more direct technological regulation e or some
combination thereof. International agreement to tax aviation and
shipping fuel (potentially with revenues recycled to support R&D),
or otherwise stimulate market demand for alternatives, could
greatly facilitate collective action. As means of managing demand,
price-signals of this kind are more feasible than other theoretical
measures, such as international moratoriums on airport expansion.
New technologies will likely require new standards, agreed
upon by global certifying institutions and classification companies.
Requiring verified vessel efficiency ratings may incentivise
Table 1
Overview of main functions of international governance institutions.
Functions Key features Main added value
Guidance & Signal  Results from overall agreement, including
targets/objectives
 Aligns actors across countries
Setting Rules  Various forms of obligations and standards  Enables action by addressing interdependence & competitiveness concerns
Transparency& Accountability  Reporting, review/verification, compliance  Contributes to effective reciprocity and implementation and mutual trust
Means of Implementation  Capacity building, technology transfer and finance
(North-South)
 Facilitates pooling of donors/investors’ resources and reducing transaction costs
Knowledge & Learning  Generation and collective appraisal of
information/knowledge
 Improved and shared understanding (authoritative knowledge)
 Science and policy learning  Improved policies (learning)
Source: Oberthür et al. a (this issue).
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for alternative fuels for both shipping and aviation could be more
easily established through coordination of national mandates for
particular blends, and coordination of requirements for their use by
ports and airports eitherwithin a regional zone, or on key long-haul
routes (Victor et al., 2019). Inter-governmental coordination could
remove the risk of aircraft re-routing. International rules ensuring
that any offset schemes and/or production of alternative fuels
adhere to high quality and sustainability standards are critical to
achieve full lifecycle emission reductions and avoid side-effects.
Acceptable, successful international agreements require
consideration of distributional equity, potentially through slower
phasing-in of some measures for certain actors, or substantial
finance and technology transfer (see also ‘means of implementa-
tion’ below). Compensating developing countries for any harm
suffered is widely recognised as critical to the acceptability of in-
struments like carbon taxation (IMF, 2011).
2.3.3. Transparency and accountability
To the extent that regulation is introduced, adequate imple-
mentation would require appropriate transparency (monitoring
and verification) and accountability (enforcement). A degree of
transparency over distances and fuel use is also required before
transport-related rules can be set, in order to judge appropriate
policy targets.
In order to assess progress toward global goals, industry-wide
(international) efforts are needed to ensure transparency, for
example on alternative fuel use and associated emissions over the
full lifecycle. Transparency over industry performance also em-
powers civil society to pressure identifiable laggards. Effective in-
ternational carbon trading also relies on preventing multiple
entities claiming the same emission reduction (‘double counting’).
2.3.4. Means of implementation (Capacity building, technology and
finance)
In shipping, both state and private sector actions can improve
availability and cost of capital, incentivising innovation and over-
coming the ‘landlord-tenant’ problem. The scale and effectiveness
of action will increase with international coordination. In addition,
developing countries have a particular need to access financial re-
sources and technology. A proportion of revenues from global
carbon pricing could in principle be earmarked to this purpose,
and/or to R&D (ITF, 2018) (see also ‘knowledge and learning’,
below).
Chronic underfunding of R&D, including for advanced biofuels
(IMO, 2017a & b), suggests the need for international governance,
for example to marshal effort towards particular technological
roadmaps. Mobilising the effort to decarbonise shipping, in
particular its associated energy value chains, requires collaboration
and deliberate collective action involving not just maritime, but
also energy, infrastructure and finance sectors, supported by4
governments and intergovernmental organisations.
For aviation too, scaling up advanced biofuels is a key cross-
sectoral R&D challenge. The scale of policy, technological, and
supply-chain support necessary for bio-jet fuel development may
match levels that were required to establish conventional biofuels
for road transport in the U.S. and Brazil (IRENA, 2017). Industry has
therefore called for global subsidies as well as extension - even
diversion - of existing national-level support for road transport to
aviation. International coordination would make this more effec-
tive. This also applies to electrification, where government support
for R&D could be combined with increased public procurement
(Victor et al., 2019).
There is also a significant need to build institutional capacity in
developing and emerging countries, where aviation growth is
highest (Piera, 2015) to implement mitigation initiatives. This
might, inter alia, enable more effective participation in market-
based mechanisms.
2.3.5. Knowledge and learning
For shipping, international-level measures can help overcome
lack of reliable information on costs, correct operation and poten-
tial savings from specific operational measures or available tech-
nological solutions. Demonstration of low- or zero-carbon
technologies (including fuels) is a key R&D challenge (IEA, 2017b:
91) that could benefit from international coordination.
Aviation breakthroughs are also likely to require joint R&D,
involving airlines, governments and other stakeholders. Interna-
tionally coordinated public sector involvement is desirable, due to
industry concerns over commercial confidentiality (Piera,
interview).
Also related to learning, there is a need to sensitise actors in
rapidly developing and emerging economies, where growth rates
are highest, to the significance of climate change and potential co-
benefits from aviation mitigation policies.
2.3.6. Summary
As summarised in Table 2, guidance and signal, rules to facilitate
collective action, and transparency and accountability may be
regarded as of particularly high importance to both shipping and
aviation. So too is ensuring adequate means of implementation,
including R&D support. It should be noted, however, that according
high priority to this last aspect (particularly concerning aviation)
entails a judgment that political unacceptability of demand man-
agement policies (and certainly the international coordination
thereof) means the search for technical solutions, rather than
behavioural, should remain the primary focus.
3. The governance landscape
Based on a screening of existing databases of international
climate-related institutions (Rayner et al., 2018: 15e18), further
Table 2
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stitutions performing relevant international governance functions
(reflecting the period over which research was conducted). Find-
ings are summarised in on-line supplemental material (here);
judgments over adequacy are left until section 4.
Decarbonisation of international aviation and shipping has been
subject to international governance since 1997, when the Kyoto
Protocol (Art. 2.2) assigned responsibility to the International Civil
Aviation Authority (ICAO) and International Maritime Organization
(IMO) respectively. International transport emissions continue to
be handled primarily by these two UN bodies. While neither has
climate protection as its primary function, each has in principle the
authority to impose legally-binding, enforceable sectoral standards.
Each maintains links to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to whom international aviation and
shipping emissions are reported as ‘international bunker fuels’,
separately from national totals. In the following, the governance
‘landscapes’ pertaining to shipping and aviation are described in
turn.3.1. Shipping
In addition to Kyoto, the Convention on the International
Maritime Organization, and the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) arguably also provide the IMO with competence to
regulate GHG emissions. The 1973 International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by and incorpo-
rated in the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL), is the most important in-
ternational convention covering vessel-source pollution. The
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) takes decisions
affecting the IMO’s 173 member countries, and debates proposals
for technical, operational and market-based measures (Shi, 2016).
The significant decisions it has taken (as of 2019) are described in
section 4.
Although involvement of the UNFCCC is relatively limited,
Parties to the PA have discretion to include international shipping
in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Shipping
emissions are also captured under the PA’s collective, economy-
wide goals and Global Stocktake. The IMO is expected to facilitate
the determination of international shipping’s fair contribution,
within the spirit of the PA (Chircop et al., 2018).
The regulatory role of the European Union is also significant,
particularly on account of its (potential or actual) extra-territorial
reach, and impetus it potentially provides to the IMO. After the
creation of an emissions monitoring, reporting, and verification5
(MRV) system for ships using EU ports (step one, whose first
reporting period started in January 2018), and maritime reduction
targets (step two), a third step contemplates some form of market-
based measure. The EU’s emissions trading scheme is able to
include maritime emissions of vessels travelling between EU ports,
and potentially beyond.
Various transnational private standard-setting (‘green ship-
ping’) initiatives have emerged in response to increased consumer
concern, retail shipper demands, and regulation. The industry-led
Clean Cargo Working Group (CCWG) and the NGO-led Sustain-
able Shipping Initiative are increasing business knowledge and
transparency, with a view to changing behaviour. The CCWGworks
with around 50 ocean freight carriers and cargo owners to analyse/
compare efficiency. RightShip and Carbon War Room operate a
jointly developed rating system, grading individual ships on design
efficiency, while the Clean Shipping Index covers several key
pollutants.
Under the auspices of the Large Cities Climate Leadership Group
(C40 Cities), the World Ports Climate Initiative has promoted in-
formation sharing, established a framework for CO2 footprint in-
ventory and management, and increased support for ship indexing.
The Getting to Zero Coalition formed in 2019 under the aus-
pices of the Global Maritime Forum and the World Economic
Forum, comprises over 90 companies within maritime, energy,
infrastructure and finance sectors, supported by intergovernmental
organisations and 14 governments. Its ambition is to commercially
operationalise deep-sea zero emission vessels by 2030 (Global
Maritime Forum, 2019). The Global Maritime Forum was also
instrumental in establishing the Poseidon Principles, the first
sector-specific and self-governing global climate-alignment
agreement among financial institutions, aimed at channelling
finance towards lower-carbon shipping (World Economic Forum,
2019).3.2. Aviation
As the leading sectoral governance institution, founded by the
1944 Chicago Convention, the ICAO sets standards and recom-
mended practices (SARPs) to facilitate coordinated evolution of
international civil aviation, potentially incorporating decarbon-
isation. In developing relevant SARPs, a dedicated Committee on
International Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) (est. 1983)
has a mandate to work closely with the UNFCCC Secretariat and the
IPCC.
In 2010, the ICAO agreed two aspirational goals: 2% annual fuel
3 The Tony de Brum Declaration, announced at the ‘One Planet’ Paris follow-up
summit (2017) specifically urges IMO action. As of April 2018, 44 IMO member
countries had signed this informal declaration.
4 An equivalent instrument applying to existing ships was in under negotiation
during 2020.
T. Rayner Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxxefficiency improvement, maintained from 2020 to 2050; and ‘car-
bon-neutral growth’ from 2020. A system of State Action Plans,
essentially seeking to induce governments to monitor countries’
aviation emissions and identify reduction measures, was adopted
to facilitate achievement of the aspirational goals (Piera, 2016). A
CO2 standard, adopted in 2016, will apply to new aircraft designs
from 2020, and those already in production as of 2023. The ICAO’s
adoption of a framework for market-basedmechanisms has led to a
3-stage scheme dubbed CORSIA (‘Carbon Offsetting and Reduction
Scheme for International Aviation’). This aims to stabilise CO2
emissions by 2020, principally by off-setting post-2020 emissions
growth or using approved biofuels (ICAO, 2016a).
As with shipping, the EU is a noteworthy actor. The controversial
decision to include international aviation in the emissions trading
scheme (first mooted in 2005) significantly shifted the global reg-
ulatory landscape, prompting industry commitments led by the
International Air Transport Association (IATA). In 2009, the Air
Transport Action Group (ATAG) which includes airports, airlines,
air traffic management organisations, and manufacturers,
committed to improving fleet fuel efficiency by 1.5% annually
(2008e2020), cap net sectoral emissions at 2020 levels, and halve
net emissions from 2005 levels by 2050 (ATAG, 2014).
Since 2019, the World Economic Forum’s public-private Clean
Skies for Tomorrow initiative has offered a purpose-built platform
for actors throughout the aviation value chain to facilitate the
transition to commercial net-zero flying by mid-century, with SAF
production at scale by 2030 as a key objective (World Economic
Forum, 2020).
3.3. Potential conflicts among institutions and principles
Decarbonisation governance is undertaken in an institutional
context that isn’t always conducive. In international shipping, two
important international law principles, Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR) and No More
Favourable Treatment’ (NMFT), can at times appear at cross-
purposes. CBDR, enshrined in the UNFCCC, requires developed
states to bear greater responsibility (Martinez-Romera, 2017),
while NMFT, consistently applied to all IMO treaty instruments (Shi,
2016), requires port states to enforce applicable standards uni-
formly. While developing states have mostly insisted on CBDR-
based regulation, developed countries have tended to favour
NMFT as the basis. Exempting or giving preferential treatment to
developing country-registered ships, however, risks undermining
the ‘whole purpose of reducing emissions from international
shipping’ (Chircop et al., 2018: 50).
Similarly, in aviation the ICAOmust also navigate the competing
principles of CBDR (derived from the UNFCCC) and non-
discrimination, derived from the Chicago Convention ("Martinez-
Romera, 2017). It has done so, with varying degrees of success,
through its own principle of ‘special circumstances and respective
capabilities’ (Piera, 2015).
Finally, the Chicago Convention, designed in the 1940s expressly
to facilitate the expansion of global civil aviation, does not mention
environment. Despite environmental protection being recognised
in updated strategic objectives for 2013e16, in cases of conflict
development has been seen to take precedence (Piera, 2016).
4. Assessing the governance complex
Having set out the sectorally relevant institutions and initiatives,
andmapped them against key governance needs (see supplemental
material), this section assesses how far existing arrangements
contribute to fulfilling the critical governance functions. To arrive at
an overall evaluation, assessments for all institutions have been6
aggregated (taking due account of any overlaps and conflicts) and
compared to the previously derived hypothetical needs and po-
tentials of international cooperation (summarised in Table 2).
Where possible, three levels of governance supply are distin-
guished: high (where needs/potential are largely met), medium
(partially met), and low (largely unmet). Where details are lacking,
or further more in-depth research was not possible, a more quali-
tative judgment is offered.4.1. Shipping
4.1.1. Guidance and signal
While conspicuously omitting international shipping, the PA set
a clear expectation that the IMO should act for the sector.3 After
years of relative inaction, the IMO has begun to offer significant
guidance and signal of its own. Its Initial Strategy (IMO, 2018),
agreed in 2018 (to be revised in 2023) promises GHG reduction by
at least 50% on 2008 levels by 2050. Though falling short of calls for
complete decarbonisation by 2035 (ITF, 2018), and setting a CO2-
intensity reduction goal (40% by 2030 compared to 2008 levels)
that was already three-quarters met (ICCT, 2018), the wording
usefully signals possible ratcheting in future, and envisages an
eventual total phase out. Subsequent adoption of ‘science-based
targets’ by high-profile shipping companies (Milne, 2018), and
founding of the Getting to Zero coalition, suggest a signal being
widely received. Getting to Zero has in addition set out a clear
definition of ‘zero’, clarifying that alternative fuels must avoid fossil
fuels at all stages of their supply chain (Global Maritime Forum,
2019). These recent advances suggest that overall delivery of this
crucial function by the existing governance complex has moved
from low to medium.
4.1.2. Rules to facilitate collective action
The Initial Strategy proposes candidate measures, yet to be
agreed, including market-based and enhanced efficiency regula-
tions. Judgments as to their adequacymust await the revised (2023)
Strategy’s precise selection of the promised short-, mid- and long-
term ‘further measures’, and accompanying implementation
schedule. Past obstruction, however, from the likes of Saudi Arabia,
Brazil, Japan and the US, presage difficult negotiations.
Technical and operational measures have been agreed through
MARPOL, notably the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) adop-
ted in 2011. This requires progressively less CO2 emitted per unit of
work, eventually requiring vessels built after 2025 to be 30% more
efficient. The precise means are left to designers and ship-owners.
The IMO also requires all sea-going ships above 400 tonnes to use a
Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) to identify
energy-saving measures already undertaken and potential further
steps, and to have monitoring and evaluation procedures.
Though positive, EEDI requirements are weakened by their
application solely to new vessels.4 In effect, just 1% annual
improvement in global efficiency can be expected by 2025 (IMO,
2017a/b). For its part, the SEEMP does not require actual imple-
mentation of identifiedmeasures. Evenwith full implementation of
EEDI and SEEMP, shipping emissions could still increase fourfold
compared with 1990 (Shi, 2016). Speed remains unregulated, and
the failure to levy any tax on international marine fuels represents a
further, major weakness in the instrument portfolio.
5 Piera also lists State Action Plans, considered here mainly under ‘transparency
and accountability’ and ‘means of implementation’ headings.
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‘three-step approach’ (IMO, 2015), moving from data collection, to
analysis, then potentially further regulations. Since 2019, ships over
5000 tonnes have had to report fuel consumption figures. The
requirement to report distance and time travelled may itself pro-
mote energy savings and therefore emissions reduction.
Transnational private standards initiatives, while constituting
progress and achieving impressive coverage in some cases (CCWG
represents 85% of global ocean container capacity), fall short in
their ambition particularly by focusing on emissions intensity, not
absolute or cumulative emissions (Scott et al., 2017). Data reliability
and transparency can also be problematic (ibid).
Overall, despite a degree of recent progress, the delivery by the
existing governance complex of this critically important gover-
nance function must still be considered low.
4.1.3. Transparency and accountability
Transparency aspects have gradually improved, notably through
the on-going parallel IMO and EU data collection processes. But the
IMO’s new system lacks the detail originally envisaged in the EU’s
MRV proposals, using metrics too limited to establish real opera-
tional efficiency of individual ships. Furthermore it lacks the third-
party verification and public disclosure provisions of the EU’s initial
proposal (T&E, 2019). Moreover, to harmonise with the IMO, the EU
Commission subsequently removed the requirement for collection
of cargo data (essential for establishing actual operational effi-
ciency), lessening the incentive to improve efficiency.
Regarding switching to alternative fuels, the IMO is yet to
establish firm rules on transparency to ensure accurate reporting of
full lifecycle emissions, avoiding double counting, and could learn
from the more advanced ICAO (Rehmatulla et al., 2020).
Among transnational initiatives, while the CCWG aims to pro-
vide reliable year-on-year emissions data from signatory carriers,
this information is only available to members. While rating
schemes developed by RightShip and the Environmental Ship Index
do grant public access to vessel-level emission data, these initia-
tives lack industry-wide influence, and a single, standardised
methodology (Scott et al., 2017).
Overall, delivery of this important governance function,
although showing some improvement over time, could be scored at
best as low-medium.
4.1.4. Means of implementation
Technical cooperation and transfer of technology relating to en-
ergy efficiency is currently delivered (on state request) through the
IMO’s Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme, and related
Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on Facilitation of Transfer of Tech-
nology for Ships. In cooperation with other international bodies,
the IMO has also operated (since 2015) various technical coopera-
tion (GLOMEEP) and capacity building (Capacity Building for
Climate Mitigation in the Maritime Shipping Industry) pro-
grammes. The performance of these has not been reported publicly,
but the sums involved appear relatively low. The IMO’s Initial
Strategy refers to further technical cooperation, research and
development and capacity-building activities as candidate future
measures.
Lack of finance for retrofitting existing ships is partially
addressed by transnational initiatives such as the Sustainable
Shipping Initiative’s ‘Save As You Sail’ and CarbonWar Room’s Self-
Financing Fuel Saving Mechanism. These have potential to facilitate
retrofits without capital expenditure, and are supported by the
European Investment Bank’s Green Shipping Guarantee (GSG) pilot
programme. However, lack of industry demand has hampered their
diffusion (Smith, interview).
The launch of the Poseidon Principles in 2019 constitutes7
another positive development with further potential. Signatory
financial institutions, representing around a third of the global ship
finance portfolio, have committed to consider alignment with IMO
decarbonisation goals in lending decisions (World Economic
Forum, 2019). However, big Asian lenders have been conspicu-
ously absent (Bakhsh, 2020). Moreover, targets for individual sig-
natories regarding ‘climate alignment’ are not specified.
R&D finance for advanced low-carbon fuels remains significantly
under-funded (Smith, interview). How far the Getting to Zero coa-
litionwill provide impetus remains to be seen, but its cross-sectoral
reach is welcome. In terms of improving access to capital and
finance for R&D, international development banks have been
generally slow to respond. As well as committing greater resources
to alternative fuels, meaningful decarbonisation will require them
to reduce (currently generous) support to short-term - but ulti-
mately counter-productive - solutions, namely LNG infrastructure
(Smith, interview).
For these reasons, although the need for this governance func-
tion is high, to date the overall level of delivery by the existing
governance complex, whilst gradually improving, has been low
(particularly given continued mis-allocation of resources to LNG
and relatively low financing of R&D).
4.1.5. Knowledge and learning
Gaps in delivering this particular governance function centre on
clear demonstration of the benefits of currently available technolo-
gies, and coordinated R&D and demonstration for new ones. Here,
Getting to Zero’s commitment to catalyze demonstrations, pilot
projects etc. represent a notable recent advance, at least on paper,
but coordinated activity elsewhere is less evident.
The World Ports Climate Initiative’s information sharing
regarding on-shore measures also merits recognition.
4.2. Aviation
4.2.1. Guidance and signal
A global-level signal of roughly what level of emissions consti-
tutes international aviation’s ‘fair share’ in achieving the PA’s long-
term goal is conspicuously lacking. Relative to the daunting chal-
lenge of ‘Paris-compliance’, the signal sent by relevant governance
institutions falls well short. Factoring in aviation’s non-CO2 emis-
sions, which more than double overall warming (IPCC, 1999), the
gap widens. The ICAO has never set a long-term absolute reduction
target, while the significance of the industry’s own commitment to
halve net emissions by 2050 is debatable, given its apparent reli-
ance on offsetting and potentially unscalable or unsustainable
sources of biofuel.
4.2.2. Rules to facilitate collective action
Although other rules exist, the CO2 standard and CORSIA are the
most significant (Piera, 2016: 2).5 As currently conceived, neither is
capable of reducing aviation emissions in absolute terms. The CO2
standard reflects the industry’s own commitment to 2% annual
efficiency improvement. Recent implementation has fallen short,
slowing to 0.6% in the years 2014e2016 (IEA, 2019). No assessment
has apparently ever been conducted intowhat the standard implies
for absolute emission levels from the global fleet (Lee, 2018).
CORSIA envisaged post-2020 aviation growth beyond a baseline
(calculated as the average of 2019 and 2020 emissions) being offset,
primarily by investments in out-of-sector mitigation projects. By
leaving baseline emissions unregulated, potentially only 6% of
T. Rayner Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxxinternational aviation emissions will be covered between 2015 and
2050 (ICSA, 2018). Significant uncertainties over CORSIA’s ultimate
design and effectiveness were exacerbated in 2020 by the Covid-19
pandemic, when ICAO’s Council opted to shift the baseline year to
2019, ensuring less demanding targets for the scheme’s pilot phase
up to 2023, and potentially beyond (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).
During the pilot phase and first implementation period
(2024e2026), participation is voluntary; several G20 states have
opted out. From the second phase (2027e2035), with limited ex-
ceptions all states are due to participate. But ICAO’s non-binding
goals are not assigned or ‘attributed’ to particular states or opera-
tors. Instead, all states are encouraged to strive collectively to
achieve them, with the effect of reducing incentives for individual
actors to implement technological or operational measures (rather
than purchasing more economical offsets, effectively ‘free-riding’
on other sectors’ efforts). Moreover, if governments prefer income
from sales of credits for emission reductions over including them in
national mitigation programmes, offsetting projects could even
weaken developing countries’ Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions to the PA (Larsson et al., 2019).
Concerns over reliance on forestry and credits from past, less
robust CDM projects (Stay Grounded, 2018) were partially allayed by
the decision to exclude projects started before 2016 from Eligible
Emissions Units for the pilot stage (ICAO, 2020). Reliance on biofuels
remains risky, however; standards designed to ensure sustainability
have remained under development (behind closed doors).
Meaningful demand management, required as part of the policy
portfolio if aviation is to become Paris-compliant (see section 2.1),
is absent. Although potentially key to internalising externalities, the
Chicago Convention’s prohibition of taxation on arrival of fuel
already onboard aircraft has been widely extended to become a
general exemption for fuel on international flights, and enshrined
in numerous bilateral agreements. ICAO’s Council has endorsed
charges (for use of facilities) rather than taxes; the Assembly’s
subsequent endorsement has effectively ruled out kerosene taxa-
tion at international level (Piera, 2016).6
Overall, although ICAO has made a degree of progress in recent
years, the flaws, weaknesses and significant uncertainties
described above mean that achievement of this critically important
governance function is still rather low.
4.2.3. Transparency and accountability
ICAO’s State Action Plans were designed in part to improve
monitoring, and thereby transparency of implementation, of
various commitments. Whilst representing significant progress,
concerns have been expressed about accuracy of data or, in some
cases, lack of evidence of implementation (Piera, 2016: 19).
Enforcement is also problematic, especially where states lack ca-
pacity and/or commitment (Piera, interview). Countries cannot be
made to enforce SARPs on airlines, and there is a lack of publicly
available information on related compliance.
For CORSIA, detailed work on monitoring, reporting and verifi-
cation and registries, is on-going, to enable airlines to track how
many credits they need, and governments to check they have
bought them. Provisions have been agreed to prevent double
counting of emission reductions by airlines and the countries
developing offset projects. ICAO’s Sustainable Aviation Fuels
framework is more robust in its accounting for full lifecycle emis-
sions, and in incentivising production accordingly, than equivalent
practice in the shipping sector (Rehmatulla, 2020). Concerns
remain, however, regarding consistency of application of agreed6 In principle, states can remove tax exemption from bilateral air service
agreements.
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Emission Unit Eligibility Criteria for offset credits, and actual sav-
ings from SAF use (Climate Action Tracker, 2020).
A ‘governance supply’ rating of medium seems reasonable, at
least as a snapshot of developments as of 2019.
4.2.4. Means of implementation
The key governance need here is to ensure adequate aviation
R&D funding, and particularly support for SAF development. While
annual civil aerospace industry R&D has been estimated at $15
billion (ICAO/ATAG, 2014), it is hard to judge how well targeted
towards decarbonisation this is. The governmental response to calls
for global subsidies for SAF production and use remains frag-
mented. Supply chain development and measures to reduce cost
premiums are still lacking (IEA, 2017b).
Regarding necessary institutional capacity building, ICAO runs a
comparatively large technical cooperation programme (Piera,
2015). ICAO’s requirement for State Action Plans has prompted
many countries to address aviation climate impacts for the first
time (Piera, 2016). To offer assistance (including finance) for State
Action Plans, ICAO has established partnerships with the EU, UN
Development Programme and the Global Environment Facility
(ICAO, 2016b).
Despite significant efforts to build capacity, given the identified
need to fund breakthrough technologies substantially, overall de-
livery of this function by existing international governance ar-
rangements should arguably be classed as low-medium at best.
4.2.5. Knowledge and learning
Although precise details are hard to obtain, (joint) R&D for low-
carbon technologies/fuels, involving airlines, governments and
other stakeholders (the key knowledge and learning-related
governance need), is reported to be happening to some extent
(see the ‘Collaborative Climate Action across the Air Transport
World’ initiative reported to the UNFCCC). ICAO’s Global Frame-
work for Aviation Alternative Fuels offers a database for relevant
activities and supports initiatives and projects, while the Clean Skies
for Tomorrow initiative features regular workshops, dialogues,
analytical reports and strategic guidance to engage actors
throughout the aviation value chain and related industries.
4.3. Summary: significant governance gaps
Despite some notable recent improvements, the most critical
decarbonisation governance functions are a long way from fulfil-
ment for international transport (Table 4). For shipping, the IMO’s
Initial Strategy may be regarded as an overdue breakthrough, of-
fering significantly improved guidance and signal, with potential to
translate by 2023 into more meaningful rules to facilitate collective
action. However, means of implementation and especially funding
for R&D, will also need particular attention. For aviation, the scar-
city of acceptable near-term decarbonisation options inclined the
industry and its international regulators towards reliance on out-
of-sector action, through an instrument (CORSIA), designed
essentially to offset, not reduce, emissions. Long-term guidance and
signal is weaker than for shipping, and overall the aviation-related
governance response carries the risk that development of techno-
logical solutions by the industry itself is dis-incentivised by the
over-riding concern to operationalise CORSIA (IEA, 2017b). Current
policies could still leave international aviation consuming up to 10%
of the total global cumulative CO2 budget available until 2100 if
temperature rise is not to exceed 2 C (Lee, 2018).
5. Towards a more adequate governance response
The following discussion briefly sets out some options worth
T. Rayner Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxxconsidering in addressing key governance gaps identified, function
by function. Space constraints prevent a more in-depth assessment
of their feasibility.
5.1. Guidance and signal
The credibility and visibility of the decarbonisation signal over
time will be critical to ensuring adequate international action.
Further work, both analytic and diplomatic, could usefully clarify
and signal an appropriate, fair contribution from aviation and
shipping to securing long-term temperature targets, in the context
of the broader climate regime centred on the UNFCCC. This should
take into account, inter alia, sectoral circumstances of each, the
likelihood of short-term technological breakthroughs and the
relationship to on-going developments in other sectoral systems
(recall from section 2.1 the importance to shipping of low-carbon
transitions more widely). Periodic adjustments to the long-term
sectoral goals for each could be made by ICAO and IMO in
conjunction with developments in the UNFCCC, evolving under-
standing of the likely contribution of negative emissions, and actual
progress of decarbonisation (Chircop et al., 2018). Were negative
emissions technologies to be reserved for genuine CO2 removal
(rather than simply offsetting increased emissions), more ambi-
tious sectoral decarbonisation goals would need to be set. But
whatever the means to establish it, the decarbonisation signal for
both shipping and aviation needs significant strengthening.
5.2. Setting rules
No measure in isolation will deliver adequate decarbonisation,
for either shipping or aviation. To address the identified regulatory
gaps for shipping, the IMO needs to adopt new, concrete measures,
incorporating review and update procedures. Regulating existing
ships’ speed and efficiency would be obvious steps (ITF, 2018). A
carbon levy on bunker fuels has gained traction as a potential in-
strument (IIMF, 2016; NewClimate, 2019; Larocca, 2020), for both
emission-reduction and revenue raising purposes (with proceeds
subsidising alternatives and/or supporting further R&D). Elements
of both CBDR and NMFT can be incorporated in new instruments,
offering the chance to overcome objections from key developing or
emerging countries.
A range of necessary actions cut across several sectoral and
governance levels, and require involvement of a corresponding
range of regulatory bodies. Traditional IMO-led regulation alone
will likely not muster the scale of effort needed. Here, the IMO
could be more explicit in defining appropriate roles for its member
governments and private actors, and attempting to mobilise sec-
toral regulators beyond shipping. For example, in developing
innovative new low-carbon fuels, the importance of extending
regulation further up the supply chain, to ensure production is itself
effectively decarbonised, is becoming clearer (see e.g. UMAS and
ETC, 2019), as is the importance of both economic incentives and
regulatory intervention to lower their cost. Steps to co-ordinate
port-level charging schemes (see COGEA et al., 2017) could com-
plement carbon pricing at a global level.Table 4
Summary of governance function importance and fulfilment.




Need Actual Need Actual Need A
Aviation High Low High Low High M
Shipping High Medium High Low High L
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Although clearly challenging, and presupposing commitment
from key member governments, in principle the IMO possesses
many of the ‘success factors’ required by a would-be orchestrator: a
focal institution in the relevant issue area; convening power; the
ability to delegate legitimacy; resources to enable; and recognition
of the need for reform through greater consultation and engage-
ment of new actors (Lister, 2015: 126; cf. Scott et al., 2017).
For aviation, CORSIA’s three-yearly review cycle provides an
opportunity to ratchet ambition, and to reconsider ICAO’s 2020
decision to weaken the baseline; the 2022 Assembly will be a
pivotal moment. Once the emission reductions delivered by CORSIA
become more precisely quantified, attention could focus on better
alignment of the CO2 standard for new planes with industry targets
for carbon neutral growth, 2% annual efficiency improvement and
halving of emissions by 2050 (IEA, 2017b).
As Section 2.1 noted, some degree of demand management ap-
pears unavoidable if aviation is to do its ‘fair share’ to meet Paris
long-term goals. However, international coordination of this remains
problematic, particularly given the de facto prohibition on taxation of
kerosene. In theory, this and other governance gaps could be
addressed by amendments to the Chicago Convention. In practice,
however, more frequent meetings of the Assembly, where more
progressive states can act as a counterweight to the power of the
more conservative ICAO Council offer a more realistic hope (Piera,
2016: 8). Moreover, fuel taxation could still be agreed bilaterally
between states. EU Member States, for example, could show lead-
ership here, taxing intra-EU flights, with negligible impact on GDP
(CE Delft, 2018), and proclaiming this as part of the EU’s Nationally
Determined Contribution under the PA (T&E, 2018b).
In both shipping and aviation, steps to coordinate the intro-
duction of alternative fuel blending mandates and standards, with
potential to provide demand stability and stimulate production in
the relatively near term, deserve investigation (T&E, 2018b; Victor
et al., 2019). To overcome inertia at both the IMO and ICAO, greater
use could be made of regional level or bilateral agreements,
allowing the development of low-carbon trade corridors. For
example, given its importance in global trade (and pre-supposing a
more climate-engaged post-Trump administration), shipping and
aviation travelling to the U.S. could be required to meet stricter
emission targets.5.3. Transparency and accountability
As noted above, Parties to the PA have the discretion to include
international transport in their Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions. Inclusion in the PA’s Global Stocktake of reporting on sectoral
emissions by the IMO, ICAO, as well as State Parties’ NDC com-
mitments, could usefully enhance transparency and accountability
(and potentially also knowledge and learning). It will in any case be
important to ensure that accurate and consistent information about
emission trajectories is available at regular intervals, to allow an
assessment of approaches implemented (Chircop et al., 2018).and Means of Implementation Knowledge and learning
ctual Need Actual Need Actual
edium High Low-medium? Medium-high ?
ow-medium High Low Medium-high ?
T. Rayner Earth System Governance xxx (xxxx) xxx5.4. Means of implementation
Energy projects, potentially in developing and middle-income
countries where abundant untapped renewable resources could
be exploited to produce low-cost zero-carbon energy sources for
shipping (and more widely), have potential to bring significant
development benefits (Global Maritime Forum, 2019). Here, inter-
national development banks could be encouraged to play a signif-
icantly bigger role, developing infrastructure and facilitating
technology transition both onshore and in ships. National govern-
ments might collaborate with such effort, or encourage their own
domestic development banks to develop targeted instruments
(Walsh et al., 2017).
In late 2019, leading industry body the International Chamber of
Shipping proposed a $5 billion (over 10 years) ‘International
Maritime Research Fund’ to finance low-carbon R&D (raised
through a V0.6 levy per tonne of CO2). However ostensibly
attractive, however, care needs to be taken not to pre-empt
potentially more effective economic instruments (involving
significantly higher carbon prices) (Abbasov, 2020).
Currently nascent partnerships to develop zero or low-emission
fuels through joint R&D across shipping, other harder-to-abate
sectors and energy interests, have potential to significantly
expand the pool of capital and expertise to innovate, and increase
the likelihood that production and transportation infrastructure
will be available once commercially viable (Shell and Deloitte,
2020).
In aviation, R&D spending needs a significant boost to
encourage technological breakthroughs, such as enhanced battery
power or hydrogen, as well as further development of SAFs. A joint
fund, potentially under Mission Innovation could leverage existing
commitments by some national governments, such as the UK.
Opportunities could also be explored to allow institutions and
instruments under the PA to assist implementation of measures
agreed by ICAO and IMO. The technology mechanism described
under the PA’s Article 10, for example, dealing with mitigation
technology transfermore broadly, may offer further possibilities for
cooperation and coordination.
5.5. Knowledge and learning
For aviation, R&D-related efforts by national governments, air-
lines, manufacturers and other stakeholders, on low-carbon aircraft
design and advanced biofuels, could be more coordinated.
For shipping, in addition to the on-going efforts of Getting to
Zero, leveraging current entrepreneurial efforts by the likes of the
CCWG or the Sustainable Shipping Initiative as part of a wider IMO
orchestration strategy could facilitate ‘demonstration effects’,
through pilot projects and other information dissemination (Lister,
2015). The willingness of multiple private stakeholders including
energy producers to undertake demonstration projects needs un-
derpinning by stronger engagement from governments and the
IMO to help prioritise, and to incentivise wider participation (Victor
et al., 2019).
6. Conclusions
If international shipping and aviation were countries, each
would be responsible for annual emissions equivalent to those of
Germany (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018). Away from the
spotlight of the official climate regime, both have responded slowly
and selectively to calls to decarbonise. Arguably, however, their
unique institutional positions could provide relatively conducive
circumstances for doing better, provided political will solidifies.
This is because unlike the UNFCCC, the IMO and ICAO have10authority to impose legally-binding, enforceable sectoral standards,
including for emission reduction. In theory at least, these distinc-
tive features could facilitate progress. There are currently a range of
exciting ideas for delivering decarbonisation, particularly for ship-
ping, where the IMO-level agreement of 2018 has catalysed a range
of stakeholders into action, across maritime, energy, infrastructure
and finance sectors. With further collaboration across these sectors,
supported by national governments and international organisa-
tions, shipping has the potential to become a catalyst for a broader,
global energy transition, unlocking the market for zero-emission
fuels more broadly (Global Maritime Forum, 2019).
Casting a shadow over this prospect, however, are poor insti-
tutional transparency and evident potential for regulatory capture
(InfluenceMap, 2017). Undue influence can be exercised in the IMO
by certain flag states, and ‘whistle-blowers’ punished
(Transparency International, 2018). Similarly, for the ICAO, strict
secrecy and deference to industry is the norm. This presents chal-
lenges to those recognising the urgency of regulatory progress in
these key sectoral systems, and specifically how far more regionally
led regulation should be encouraged. Arguably, steps to incorporate
international transport better into the PA, in parallel with on-going
ICAO and IMO activity, could bring greater consistency in the po-
sitions adopted by states in different venues (T&E, 2018b) -
potentially lessening certain countries’ tendency to obstructionism.
In the meantime, regional-level action, particularly by the EU
through its European Green Deal, is likely to remain critical in
demonstrating consistent regulatory leadership, for both shipping
and aviation. So too will partnership initiatives led by more pro-
gressive sections of industry, as increasingly evident in the Getting
to Zero and Clean Skies Tomorrow coalitions. Such leadership is
clearly needed to demonstrate that decarbonisation of interna-
tional transport need not remain stuck on the slow route.
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